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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In equitable actions to quiet title or quid timet any claim or assertion
casting doubt upon the plaintiff's rights, sufficiently damages his material
interests to present a condition of justiciability.24 Logically, it would seem
to follow that where differences between parties have reached a point where
future litigation is inevitable, a sufficient controversy, justifying invoking
the declaratory procedure, is present.25
While it is yet too early to predict with assurance what scope the courts
will give to declaratory actions, an encouraging trend is discernible. 26 It is
submitted that the instant case unnecessarily curtails the use of the de-
claratory actions. It is definitely "out-of-line" with the more acceptable
decisions.27
W. F.
EVIDENCE--EXPERT WITNESSES-HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION-MODEL Ex-
PERT TESTIMONY AcT-[California].-In a suit to recover the reasonable
value of legal services, a hypothetical question was asked of an expert
witness by plaintiff. No objection was made to it then by defendant, but
on appeal he contended that it was error to allow the hypothetical question
because it omitted mention of certain letters that had a bearing on the
case. Held; the competency of a hypothetical question is not affected by
the fact that it does not contain all the facts bearing on the issue in the
case.1
Because of the abuses to which it has been subjected, the abolition of the
hypothetical question has been urged.2 The instant case is in accord with
the general rule.3 Being permitted to use as few facts as he desires in
framing his hypothetical question, a clever lawyer can often, by conceal-
ing the real significance of the evidence or by unduly emphasizing certain
data, mislead the jury.4 Furthermore, the opinion he obtains from the wit-
ness will be remembered by the jury, but the fact that it is based upon a
partial statement of the facts in the actual case will be forgotten.5 Cross
24. Guthery v. Ball, 206 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W. 887 (1921) ; Walsh, On
Equity (1930) 541 et seq.
25. Sullivan & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Ideal Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 313 Pa. 407,
170 Atl. 263, 98 A. L. R. 1 (1934); Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 Atl.
675 (1930).
26. Note, The Declaratory Judgment and the Insurance Contract (1936)
46 Yale L. J. 286.
27. In a recent case almost identical with the facts of the instant case
the judge said, ". . . remedy by declaratory judgment seems to be of ideal
application to such a case." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Helmer, 15 F. Supp. 355,
356 (D. C. D. Ga., 1936).
1. Matthiesen v. Smith, 60 P. (2d) 873 (Cal., 1936).
2. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 686; 32 Am. L. Rev. 851
(1898).
3. 1 Wigmore, Ibid. sec. 682; 18 Ann. Cases 646 (1909).
4. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S. W. 405 (1908).
5. Opp v. Pryor, 294 I1. 538, 128 N. E. 580 (1920).
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examination will not remedy the deception6 because it is difficult to erase
entirely the impression created by the first opinion,7 and because an expert,
once he has given an opinion bearing upon the case, is not likely to change
it to fit hypothetical variations.8 In all fairness to the expert it might be
added that such a procedure whereby he is expected to give an opinion to
each hypothetical variation becomes ridiculous where the facts are numer-
ous and complicated, as in insanity cases. 9
Because of these abuses, a few states, including Missouri'O and Ar-
kansas,'1 require that the hypothetical question contain all undisputed facts
material to the issue. But this rule, while it is better than the general rule,
does not afford a remedy. Where all the facts are undisputed the only
possibility of abuse is in framing a very long question which may confuse
the jury. But where the facts are disputed, the party asking the question
need include only those facts which the evidence on his side tends to prove.12
Here again cross examination will be an inadequate corrective. Further-
more, the hypothetical question is not limited to facts actually proven or
directly testified to, but may assume facts which there is fair reason to
believe the evidence will produce.13 Consequently, the court, in determin-
ing whether a question is competent, must rely to a great extent upon the
good faith of counsel as to what he expects the evidence will be.14
The Model Expert Testimony Act, based upon Porfessor Wigmore's sug-
gestions,15 proposes 1) that the expert witness be permitted to give his
opinion, with its basis, without hypothetical questions and that cross exam-
ination be employed to bring out further the facts upon which it rests,
and 2) that when a hypothetical question is asked it must first be sub-
mitted in writing to the opposite party and approved by the court.10 In
some situations it may be necessary, or more helpful to the jury, to ask a
hypothetical question, and for such situations the second provision brings
the hypothetical question to its best possible form. Such is the practice in
6. One of bases of general rule is that opposing counsel can correct any
misapprehensions by cross-examination. See Herpolsheimer v. Funke, 95
N. W. 688 (Neb., 1901).
7. Opp v. Pryor, supra, note 5.
8. People v. Vanderhoof, 71 Mich. 158, 39 N. W. 28 (1888). See 32 Am.
L. Rev. 851, 855 to effect that expert will not change his opinion because it
puts him in position of disagreeing with the general drift of his own testi-
mony and thereby of impeaching himself.
9. Glueck, Mental Disorder And The Criminal Law (1927) 29.
10. Powell v. Union Pac. R. Co., 255 Mo. 420, 164 S. W. 628 (1914);
Hahn v. Hammerstein, 272 Mo. 248, 198 S. W. 833 (1917).
11. Ford v. Ford, 100 Ark. 518, 140 S. W. 933 (1911); Taylor v. Mc-
Clintock, supra, note 4. Contra, Ince v. State, 77 Ark. 426, 93 S. W. 65(1906); Mo. R. Co. v. Daniels, 98 Ark. 352, 136 S. W. 651 (1911). Inee v.
State was expressly overruled in Ford v. Ford.
12. Opp v. Pryor, supra, note 5.
13. 11 R. C. L. 586, sec. 15; Com. v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N. E. 127
(1905).
14. Ibid.
15. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 686.
16. Tentative Draft of Model Expert Testimony Act, sec. 11.
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Michigan, and it has been described as "practically ideal."17 The first pro-
posal is revolutionary. It makes possible the situation which it is the pur-
pose of the hypothetical question to avoid, namely the giving of an opinion
without letting the jury know beforehand the facts upon which it is based.'3
But while at fault theoretically, this proposal will work out better than
the present hypothetical question, especially in those jurisdictions follow-
ing the general rule that the hypothetical question need not contain all the
facts bearing on the issue in the case. Under that rule the lawyer has more
opportunity for abuse than he has under the minority rule, but the first
proposal of the act will practically eliminate all abuse by the lawyer be-
cause the statement of the facts upon which the expert's opinion is based
is shifted to the expert himself. The expert is also relieved of the necessity
of giving opinions on cross examination in accordance with hypothetical
variations. Furthermore, he is given the opportunity to base his opinion
upon data which he thinks competent and relevant. While at first thought
this might appear to be objectionable, it should work out to advantage, 9
especially in insanity cases, in connection with which criticism of the hypo-
thetical question is most vigorous.2 0 Continued decisions like that in the
principal case emphasize the need of reform, if expert testimony is to be of
real assistance in the securing of proper decisions upon complex issues of
fact.
S. K.
INSURANCE-RELATIONSIIIP By AFrINITY AS CONSTITUTING INSURABLE IN-
TFRT-[Missouri].-The relationship of a son-in-law to the insured in an
industrial life insurance policy was recently held to constitute an insurable
interest in the father-in-law when coupled with the fact that the son-in-law
had provided his father-in-law a home, taken care of him and paid his
funeral expenses.,
While, apparently at common law, life insurance policies not supported
17. 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 454 (1935).
18. 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) sec. 441.
19. 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 455 (1935).
20. Glueck, supra, note 9, pp. 29 et seq.
1. Chandler v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 S. W. (2d) 883
(Mo. App., 1936). Industrial insurance is distinguished from ordinary in-
surance in that the amounts are usually small and the premiums are paid
at weekly intervals instead of annually, semi-annually, or quarterly. For
definitions see Ark. Crawf. & Moses, Dig. Supp., 1927, sec. 6016e; L. R. A.
1916F 461. In Kentucky the requirement of insurable interest has been
held unnecessary in industrial insurance on the ground that the purpose
of such insurance is not to create a fund to provide for the future support
of the insured's family, but to provide for the proper care of the insured
in his last illness and a respectable burial. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Nelson, 170 Ky. 674, 186 S. W. 520, L. R. A. 1916F 457 (1916); contra,
Williams v. People's Life & Accident Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. 1229, 35 S. W.
(2d) 922 (1931).
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